R. M. Hare

in Freedom and Reason

Published in print June 1965 | ISBN: 9780198810926
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597589 | DOI:

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Discusses an important objection to the view that moral judgements are prescriptive: the existence of cases in which people act in ways that they know to be wrong. The objection is that if moral judgements are prescriptive, it is impossible to accept a moral judgement and yet act contrary to it; therefore prescriptivism must be wrong. It is argued that cases of moral weakness do not constitute a counterexample to prescriptivism.

Keywords: moral weakness; prescriptivism

Chapter.  6824 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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