Community Norms and Embeddedness: A Game‐Theoretic Approach

Masahiko Aoki

in Communities and Markets in Economic Development

Published in print May 2001 | ISBN: 9780199241019
Published online August 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780191601217 | DOI:
 Community Norms and Embeddedness: A Game‐Theoretic Approach

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This chapter presents a basic analytical logic of community-mechanisms from a game-theoric perspective. It formulates the basic structure of an economic domain in game form, and distinguishes between exogenous rules of the game (e.g. technology, statutory law) and community norms as endogenous rules of the game. The endogenous formation of clientship or business networks that regulate exchanges in the context of initially impersonal exchange domain (random matching) is discussed. The possible roles of a community norm and structure in the transition of a rural community to contractual relationships with outsiders to the community, and those of replication of a community norm in the context of a modern industrial organization are examined.

Keywords: community norms; game theory; embeddedness; replication; rural community

Chapter.  13860 words. 

Subjects: Economic Development and Growth

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