Chapter

Some Questions About Truth

Wolfgang Künne

in Conceptions of Truth

Published in print June 2003 | ISBN: 9780199241316
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597831 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199241317.003.0001
Some Questions About Truth

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The questions concerning truth that I plan to discuss are set up in a flowchart, and the answers to be defended in the course of the book are marked. I give my reasons for putting the Identity Theory aside (which takes truths to be facts), for bracketing Primitivism (which takes the concept of truth to be explanation‐resistant), and for shunning ‘deflationism/inflationism’ talk as underconstrained philosophical jargon. I explain what I mean by ‘alethic realism’ and ‘alethic anti‐realism’, and I argue (against Alston and D. Lewis) that the Denominalization Schema ‘It is true that p, iff p’ cannot be used as a lethal weapon against every anti‐realist conception of truth.

Keywords: alethic realism; Alston; anti‐realism; deflationism; Denominalization Schema; fact; Identity Theory; Lewis; Primitivism

Chapter.  15594 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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