Colin McGinn

in Logical Properties

Published in print November 2000 | ISBN: 9780199241811
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598029 | DOI:

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The extensional view that predicates are general terms that refer severally to the members of a set of objects that satisfy them is rejected. Instead, it is argued that predicates refer to properties, and are thus singular terms like names. The distinction between names and predicates is upheld, but it is argued that what accounts for it is not the spurious distinction between singularity and plurality of reference, but rather grammatical position, and the ontological type of the reference.

Keywords: indeterminacy; names; plural reference; predicates; predication; Quine; singular reference; Tarski semantics

Chapter.  6424 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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