Chapter

Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse

Hartry Field

in Truth and the Absence of Fact

Published in print March 2001 | ISBN: 9780199242894
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597381 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199242895.003.0008
 Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse

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Some discourse (e.g. involving vague or indeterminate terms, normative language, or conditionals) can seem ‘factually defective’: it generates issues about which there seems to be ‘no fact of the matter’. But there seems to be a difficulty in making sense of factually defective discourse, and in explaining the division between it and other discourse, if one holds that the basic notion of truth is a fairly minimal one. The chapter argues that we can overcome the difficulty: we can recognize and account for several different kinds of factual defectiveness while adhering to a very minimal notion of truth.

Keywords: conditionals; disquotation; indeterminacy; interpersonal synonymy; non‐factuality; normative discourse; reference; supervaluation; truth; vagueness

Chapter.  21399 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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