Chapter

Interests, Lobbies, and Experts

Christopher Hood, Henry Rothstein and Robert Baldwin

in The Government of Risk

Published in print August 2001 | ISBN: 9780199243631
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191599507 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199243638.003.0007
 Interests, Lobbies, and Experts

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Explores the logic of basing risk regulation on the interests of cohesive organized groups inside or outside the bureaucracy, including patterns of capture by professions as well as by orthodox producer capture. The chapter explores the extent and conditions in which state regulation of the nine case‐study risks is driven by such forces. Analysis suggests that activity by organized interests has powerful explanatory force and can help explain a number of regime features that are anomolous from market‐failure and opinion‐responsive perspectives, especially when the interests of regulatory professionals are taken into account. Moreover, careful analysis reveals that different regulatory components of the same regime, such as standard‐setting and enforcement, may be shaped by different sets of organized interests.

Keywords: capture; enforcement; organized interests; regulation; regulators; risk; standards

Chapter.  9010 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Comparative Politics

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