Nonstandard Betterness

John Broome

in Weighing Lives

Published in print August 2004 | ISBN: 9780199243761
Published online October 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602900 | DOI:
 Nonstandard Betterness

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This chapter considers and rejects three approaches to incorporating the neutrality intuition into a theory of value. The first is to suppose that betterness might be intransitive. The second is to suppose that betterness might be conditional in a particular sense. The third is to suppose that betterness can only be understood relative to a particular population.

Keywords: transitivity of betterness; conditional goodness; relative goodness

Chapter.  5715 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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