Separability of People

John Broome

in Weighing Lives

Published in print August 2004 | ISBN: 9780199243761
Published online October 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602900 | DOI:
 Separability of People

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This chapter defends the separability of people. It explains that people will be separable if and only if the neutral level for existence is the same in all contexts. It examines and rejects average utilitarianism, which conflicts with separability of people. It also rejects the view that the value of adding a person to the population might depend on the number of people who already exist.

Keywords: separability of people; average utilitarianism; existence

Chapter.  5024 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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