Chapter

A Life Worth Living

John Broome

in Weighing Lives

Published in print August 2004 | ISBN: 9780199243761
Published online October 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602900 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019924376X.003.0016
 A Life Worth Living

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This chapter defines the neutral value for extending life. This is the level of a person’s temporal wellbeing at which it is just worth the person’s continuing to live: extending the life is equally as good for the person as not extending it. The chapter examines and rejects the view that extending a person’s life is normally ethically neutral. This view is analogous to the neutrality intuition about adding a person to the population. It implies that every level of wellbeing is neutral. It may be attributed to Epicurus, who argues that death generally does not harm the person who dies. The chapter considers Epicurus’ arguments.

Keywords: Epicurus; neutral level; harm of death

Chapter.  3760 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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