Chapter

Belief

Richard Swinburne

in Epistemic Justification

Published in print June 2001 | ISBN: 9780199243792
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598524 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199243794.003.0003
 Belief

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This book is concerned with narrow‐content beliefs. One believes ‘this’ proposition as against ‘that’ proposition (normally its negation); strength of belief is a matter (if one has the second order belief) of how much more probable one believes this proposition to be than that one. That belief is contrastive, and provides the solution to the Lottery Paradox. Beliefs are involuntary; we can have infallible access to them. A belief is the belief it is, in virtue of its logical relations to others of our beliefs The publicly observable input to a believer and his output in behaviour and speech are (fallible) evidence of his beliefs.

Keywords: belief; content; narrow content; Lottery Paradox; Peacocke

Chapter.  12205 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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