Chapter

Knowledge

Richard Swinburne

in Epistemic Justification

Published in print June 2001 | ISBN: 9780199243792
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598524 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199243794.003.0009
 Knowledge

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Knowledge is (strongly) warranted (strong) true belief. For the internalist, a belief being warranted is it being justified (in the sense of the belief being rendered inductively probable by other beliefs and ultimately by basic beliefs), where the justification does not proceed through or otherwise depend on a false belief. For the main kind of externalist, the reliabilist, a belief being warranted is it being produced by a type of process that normally produces true beliefs. For Plantinga, the central element in a belief being warranted is it being produced by a properly functioning cognitive process; but I argue that his account reduces to a reliabilist account. Knowledge is only more worth having than strong true belief if warrant is intrinsically valuable (i.e. valuable in itself, in addition to the fact that it has led to truth). Internalist warrant is intrinsically valuable, but externalist warrant is not. .

Keywords: externalism; Gettier; internalism; knowledge; Plantinga; proper functioning; reliabilism; warrant; Williamson

Chapter.  14596 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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