John Campbell

in Reference and Consciousness

Published in print June 2002 | ISBN: 9780199243815
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597145 | DOI:

Series: Oxford Cognitive Science Series


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We need the notion of sense to characterize which inferences involving demonstratives are valid; the account developed so far suggests that this will be when conscious attention uses the same locations in keeping track of the object. This does not mean we have here a descriptivist account of the sense of a demonstrative; rather, the role of the content of the conscious attention emerges in which propositions involving the demonstrative term are immune to error through misidentification. There is a detailed comparison between the present approach and the views of Kaplan and Evans.

Keywords: demonstratives; immunity to error through misidentification; inference; keeping track; sense

Chapter.  14233 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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