Chapter

Indeterminacy and Inscrutability

John Campbell

in Reference and Consciousness

Published in print June 2002 | ISBN: 9780199243815
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597145 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199243816.003.0012

Series: Oxford Cognitive Science Series

 Indeterminacy and Inscrutability

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Quine's notion of stimulus meaning did not give due weight to the phenomenon of attention; but that means the notion of stimulus meaning is ill defined. When we take attention into account, however, we also have to acknowledge that attention is allocated to objects. It thus appears that there is no standpoint from which to state Quine's thesis that the data underdetermine the ascriptions of references to our terms. I also look at the implications of the present approach for the indeterminacy of translation.

Keywords: attention; indeterminacy; inscrutability; reference; stimulus meaning

Chapter.  9314 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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