Chapter

The Case for Materialism

David Papineau

in Thinking about Consciousness

Published in print April 2002 | ISBN: 9780199243822
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598166 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199243824.003.0002
 The Case for Materialism

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The basic causal argument for materialism is that since physics is causally complete, conscious states must either be physical, or they must be epiphenomenal “danglers” with no causal influence on the physical world. Papineau explores this argument in detail, paying particular attention to the concept of causation, the meaning of “physical”, the relevance of functionalism and other versions of nonreductive physicalism, and the status of the claim that physics is causally closed.

Keywords: causal argument; causal closure of physics; causal completeness of physics; causation; consciousness; functionalism; matter; nonreductive physicalism

Chapter.  12490 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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