Chapter

Conceptual Dualism

David Papineau

in Thinking about Consciousness

Published in print April 2002 | ISBN: 9780199243822
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598166 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199243824.003.0003
 Conceptual Dualism

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The best argument for the existence of phenomenal concepts is Frank Jackson's “knowledge argument”. Contra Jackson, this does not establish ontological dualism, but it does establish conceptual dualism in the sense that it shows that we have phenomenal concepts distinct from any material concepts. This analysis goes beyond the normal “ability hypothesis” response to Jackson's argument, but it appeals to the same powers of subjective imagination and introspection.

Keywords: ability hypothesis; consciousness; Frank Jackson; imagination; introspection; knowledge argument; Mary; materialism; phenomenal concept; physicalism

Chapter.  9707 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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