Chapter

Phenomenal Concepts

David Papineau

in Thinking about Consciousness

Published in print April 2002 | ISBN: 9780199243822
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598166 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199243824.003.0005
 Phenomenal Concepts

Show Summary Details

Preview

Explores the structure of phenomenal concepts. It examines how far they are expressed by everyday words, compares them to perceptual concepts, develops a quotational model of their workings, considers how far they give rise to incorrigible judgements, and discusses whether they violate Wittgenstein's “private language argument”.

Keywords: consciousness; incorrigibility; perceptual concepts; Phenomenal concepts; private language argument; quotation; Wittgenstein

Chapter.  16424 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.