Chapter

The Intuition of Distinctness

David Papineau

in Thinking about Consciousness

Published in print April 2002 | ISBN: 9780199243822
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598166 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199243824.003.0007
 The Intuition of Distinctness

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Even materialists will admit that mind‐brain identity is counterintuitive. Some materialist philosophers think that this intuition is due to the plausibility of the standard antimaterialist arguments, like Jackson's knowledge argument or Kripke's modal argument. Papineau shows that this cannot be right, since these arguments apply equally in cases in which we feel no intuition of distinctness. Instead, he draws on remarks of Thomas Nagel to argue that the intuition of distinctness is due to an “antipathetic fallacy”: we move from the true premise that phenomenal concepts don’t involve conscious feelings to the false conclusion that they don’t refer to them.

Keywords: antipathetic fallacy; consciousness; Frank Jackson; Intuition of distinctness; Kripke; mind‐brain identity; Thomas Nagel

Chapter.  4825 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Mind

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