Chapter

Monetary Sovereignty, Domestic Policies, and Intergovernmental Accord

Elie Cohen

in From the Nation State to Europe

Published in print February 2001 | ISBN: 9780199244034
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191599897 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199244030.003.0002
 Monetary Sovereignty, Domestic Policies, and Intergovernmental Accord

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It is essentially the conjunction of French and German interests that has produced the euro; a conjunction in which foreign and domestic political interests have been cloaked with an economic rationale. The argument proceeds in four stages: first, by establishing the nature of the European Central Bank (ECB), and what it implies for the French economy; second, the reasons which drove the French government to support it as a means of crisis avoidance; third, the motivation of the German government to give an earnest display of its good faith with regard to its role in Europe after unification, and to show support for the French objective; fourth, the manner in which the ending of the Deutschmark's dominance in Europe involved the adoption of principles and institutions consonant with the ‘German monetary order’.

Keywords: ECB; EU; France; Germany; monetary policy

Chapter.  7965 words. 

Subjects: European Union

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