Chapter

Regulating Europe: The Political Economy of Market‐Building

Michelle P. Egan

in Constructing a European Market

Published in print June 2001 | ISBN: 9780199244058
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191599132 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199244057.003.0002
 Regulating Europe: The Political Economy of Market‐Building

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Provides the central theoretical and analytical framework of the book. It includes an extensive review of the regulatory literature, which largely casts the European Union as analogous to a ‘regulatory state’ since it engages in widespread social and economic regulation to promote economic integration. Different theories of regulation—interest group, public interest, and public choice—are examined in order to understand current developments in European political economy. Although most accounts of regulation, often cited in the American context, have highlighted the impact of industry influence or ‘regulatory capture’, such a static view of the public–private relationship diverts attention away from other types of organizational relations. Private organizations assuming governmental functions are well known in Europe, whether it is self‐regulation, corporatism, or private interest government. Applying insights from both the European and American literature, this chapter highlights the importance of understanding the origins, practice, and consequences of regulation for broader issues of democratic governance, legitimacy, and accountability.

Keywords: accountability; European Union; governance; interest group; legitimacy; private interest; public choice; public interest; regulation; regulatory capture

Chapter.  11279 words. 

Subjects: European Union

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