Chapter

Three‐ and Four‐Dimensionalism Stated

Theodore Sider

in Four-Dimensionalism

Published in print October 2001 | ISBN: 9780199244430
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598425 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019924443X.003.0003
 Three‐ and Four‐Dimensionalism Stated

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Four‐dimensionalism may be given a rigorous and canonical formulation acceptable to both its supporters and opponents; meaningful debate as to the truth of this thesis may then proceed. This is more difficult for three‐dimensionalism, since its defining slogan ‘objects are wholly present’ seems either trivial (‘at any time at which an object exists, anything that is then part of it exists’) or too strong (‘at any time at which an object exists, anything that is ever part of it exists’). Nevertheless, several theses in the neighbourhood of three‐dimensionalism may be stated, even if none is a canonical formulation. Finally, the three‐dimensionalism/four‐dimensionalism debate is orthogonal to the debate over presentism: both presentists and non‐presentists can articulate versions of three‐ and four‐dimensionalism whose truth may then be debated.

Keywords: endurance; four‐dimensionalism; mereological essentialism; perdurance; presentism; temporal parts; three‐dimensionalism

Chapter.  8758 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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