Chapter

Identity and Unity

E. J. Lowe

in The Possibility of Metaphysics

Published in print June 2001 | ISBN: 9780199244997
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597930 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199244995.003.0003
 Identity and Unity

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The relationship between the notion of an object and the notion of unity is discussed. It is argued that we should acknowledge the possible existence of entities belonging to certain ontological categories whose members lack either the determinate identity or the determinate unity—and hence countability—that are characteristic of objects properly so‐called. Such categories, it is suggested, are needed, amongst other things, to make sense of some of the theoretical entities postulated by modern quantum physics. In this connection, a famous argument by Gareth Evans against ‘vague’ identity is countered.

Keywords: countability; determinacy; Gareth Evans; identity; objects; ontological categories; quantum physics; unity; vague identity; vagueness

Chapter.  12755 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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