Chapter

Persistence and Substance

E. J. Lowe

in The Possibility of Metaphysics

Published in print June 2001 | ISBN: 9780199244997
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597930 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199244995.003.0005
 Persistence and Substance

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Argues that the very existence of time—and, more particularly, the temporal unity of the world as one world in time—is dependent upon the existence of concrete individual substances persisting through time, with the consequence that persisting substances cannot coherently be conceived to be mere sequences or aggregates of successively existing entities, their supposed ‘temporal parts’. An argument due to David Lewis being in favour of the latter view, appealing to the so‐called problem of intrinsic change, is criticized for failing to recognize a solution to this problem, which distinguishes between temporal and atemporal modes of property exemplification.

Keywords: change; David Lewis; intrinsic properties; persistence; substance; temporal parts; time; unity

Chapter.  14857 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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