Chapter

On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's Private‐Language Argument

P. M. S Hacker

in Wittgenstein: Connections and Controversies

Published in print November 2001 | ISBN: 9780199245697
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602245 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/019924569X.003.0010
 On Misunderstanding Wittgenstein: Kripke's Private‐Language  Argument

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Professor Saul Kripke argued that the ‘real’ private language argument terminates with section 202 of the Investigations and is concerned with the logical and epistemological character of following a rule. According to his interpretation, Wittgenstein is propounding a sceptical paradox concerning rule following, which he resolves by means of a Humean answer. Careful examination of Wittgenstein’s text and of his preparatory notebooks shows this interpretation to be very far from anything Wittgenstein intended.

Keywords: assertion conditions; following rules; Hume; meaning something by an expression; practice; private language argument; rule-scepticism; S. Kripke

Chapter.  19518 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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