Doubt and Knowledge Ascription

Charles Travis

in The Uses of Sense

Published in print September 2001 | ISBN: 9780199245871
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598630 | DOI:
 Doubt and Knowledge Ascription

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This chapter argues for the occasion‐sensitivity (S‐use sensitivity) of epistemic notions, notably knowledge; and shows how that idea serves to support Wittgenstein's conception of semantic fact.

Keywords: doubt; knowledge; occasion‐sensitivity; semantic fact; Wittgenstein

Chapter.  30840 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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