The Limits of Doubt

Charles Travis

in The Uses of Sense

Published in print September 2001 | ISBN: 9780199245871
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598630 | DOI:
 The Limits of Doubt

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Explores the S‐use sensitivity of proof, arguing that there is no clear separation between an epistemic and non‐epistemic notion of proof, but that epistemology is involved in what actually entails what (which is thus an occasion‐sensitive matter). It defends a view of G. E. Moore.

Keywords: doubt; entailment; G.E. Moore; occasion‐sensitivity; possibility; proof; Wittgenstein

Chapter.  26047 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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