The Autonomy of Fact‐Stating

Charles Travis

in The Uses of Sense

Published in print September 2001 | ISBN: 9780199245871
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598630 | DOI:
 The Autonomy of Fact‐Stating

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Explores a central Wittgensteinian view: that whether words that aim to be fact stating cannot be hostage to anything other than the internal consistency of their ambitions. There is no external perspective from which one might coherently maintain a metaphysical scepticism about them.

Keywords: autonomy; fact stating; skepticism; truth bearer; Wittgenstein

Chapter.  22872 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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