Chapter

Publicity and Accepted Standards

Geoffrey Brennan and Philip Pettit

in The Economy of Esteem

Published in print March 2004 | ISBN: 9780199246489
Published online November 2004 | e-ISBN: 9780191601460 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199246483.003.0010
Publicity and Accepted Standards

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One possible effect of increased publicity for performance is on public perceptions of prevailing standards–and this effect will intensify or moderate esteem incentives. As a result, providers of information who wish to preserve high performance may have incentives to withhold certain kinds of information or to distort the information they do provide–and sometimes such withholding/distortion has desirable consequences. This complication may give rise to a certain kind of legitimate public hypocrisy. The normative implications of information provision are explored under the rubric of the ‘whistle-blower’s dilemma’.

Keywords: dilemma; hypocrisy; information; standards; whistle-blowing

Chapter.  7479 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

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