Norman Kretzmann

in The Metaphysics of Theism

Published in print September 2001 | ISBN: 9780199246533
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597886 | DOI:

Show Summary Details


Since intellect and will are conceptually distinct, and since intellect without will would not constitute a person, showing that personhood must be attributed to reality's ultimate principle remains incomplete until it can be shown to be characterized essentially by will as well. Before taking up Aquinas's arguments for will in God, his conception of will generally is examined, as the absolutely universal appetitus for what is good, associated with all being. Aquinas's arguments proposing to derive divine will from divine intellect as well as the argument from freedom are presented. The Dionysian principle, which Aquinas accepts: goodness is by its very nature diffusive of itself and (thereby) of being, commits him to a necessitarian explanation of God's willing of things other than himself.

Keywords: appetitus; Aquinas; Dionysian principle; divine intellect; divine will; freedom of choice; God; necessitarian explanation; personhood

Chapter.  12962 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.