Problems With Medical Insurance

Nicholas Barr

in The Welfare State as Piggy Bank

Published in print May 2001 | ISBN: 9780199246595
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191595936 | DOI:
 Problems With Medical Insurance

Show Summary Details


This chapter explores the wide‐ranging and well‐known problems of medical insurance, including uncertainty about future probabilities, adverse selection, and moral hazard, which lead to uninsurable conditions and upward pressures on medical spending. The chapter goes on to discuss methods of cost containment, and to assess different strategies: private funding plus private production, public funding plus public production, and public funding plus private (or mixed) production. A key conclusion is that attempts to adapt private arrangements end up looking like social insurance, in the sense that premiums are not based on individual risk and insurers are not allowed to exclude high‐risk applicants. A second key conclusion is that different strategies for financing health care have different but largely predictable problems.

Keywords: adverse selection; cost containment; medical insurance; moral hazard; social insurance; uncertainty; uninsurable conditions

Chapter.  9490 words. 

Subjects: Public Economics

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.