Chapter

Frege: Truth and Composition

Stephen Neale

in Facing Facts

Published in print November 2001 | ISBN: 9780199247158
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598081 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199247153.003.0003
 Frege: Truth and Composition

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Looks at the work of Gottlob Frege on truth and composition. It investigates Frege's idea that a sentence refers to a truth‐value, his Principle of Composition, and his abandonment of what Donald Davidson calls ‘semantic innocence’. Neale explains what kinds of slingshotian considerations prevented Frege from accepting facts as denotations of sentences and made him see sentences rather as names of truth‐values. The three sections of the chapter are: Reference and Composition; Innocence Abandoned; and The Reference of a Sentence.

Keywords: composition; facts; Gottlob Frege; Frege's Principle of Composition; Principle of Composition; Reference; semantics; sentences; slingshot arguments; truth; truth‐values

Chapter.  3452 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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