Chapter

Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument

Karl Ameriks

in Interpreting Kant's Critiques

Published in print August 2003 | ISBN: 9780199247318
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191601699 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199247315.003.0002
 Kant's Transcendental Deduction as a Regressive Argument

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Presents the original version of a regressive reading of Kant’s transcendental deduction of the categories on the basis of a detailed analysis of the B edition version and a critique of influential non-regressive interpretations by Wolff, Strawson, and Bennett. It stresses difficulties in using the deduction directly to meet traditional empiricist concerns about skepticism, and it also argues that the concluding stages of Kant’s argument are not easily separated from substantive aspects of his notions of space and time as ideal forms. This essay is influenced by the early work of Dieter Henrich, and it discusses how his stress on the ‘two part’ structure of the deduction bears on important ways in which Kant’s argument is closely related to the form and content of the Transcendental Aesthetic as well.

Keywords: B edition; ideality; regressive argument; skepticism; space; time; Transcendental Aesthetic; transcendental deduction; unity of apperception

Chapter.  8275 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

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