Chapter

New Views on Kant's Judgment of Taste

Karl Ameriks

in Interpreting Kant's Critiques

Published in print August 2003 | ISBN: 9780199247318
Published online January 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191601699 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199247315.003.0014
 New Views on Kant's Judgment of Taste

Show Summary Details

Preview

Defends the position of the previous chapter in response to a direct critique of it by Hannah Ginsborg, from the perspective of a subjectivist reading of Kantian taste. The critique provides an opportunity for clarifying ways in which an objectivist reconstruction does not have the kind of unwelcome consequences that it might at first seem to have. There is a way of reading Kant’s argument that shows how taste can be called objective for reasons that are not tied to either the kind of objectivity associated with science or a mere knowledge of causal relations or to the specific kinds of rationalist doctrines that Kant was mainly trying to warn against insofar as he was very reluctant (as he obviously was) explicitly to call his theory an objectivist one.

Keywords: beauty; causality; feeling; judgement of taste; objectivity; secondary properties; subjectivism

Chapter.  9049 words. 

Subjects: History of Western Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.