Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences

Gunther Teubner

in Varieties of Capitalism

Published in print August 2001 | ISBN: 9780199247752
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191596346 | DOI:
 Legal Irritants: How Unifying Law Ends up in New Divergences

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Recent attempts at institutional transfer of legal rules from one production regime to the other seem to produce a double irritation in the new context. As the case of transfer of continental rules on ‘good faith’ demonstrates, foreign rules are irritants not only in relation to the domestic legal discourse itself but also in relation to the economic institutions to which law is closely coupled. They force the domestic law to a reconstruction in the network of its distinctions, while provoking the economic institutions to a reconstruction of their own. Thus, they trigger two different series of events whose interaction leads to an evolutionary dynamics, which may find a new equilibrium in the eigenvalues of the legal and economic institutions involved. The result of such a complex and turbulent process is rarely a convergence of the participating legal orders, rather the creation of new cleavages in the interrelation of legal and economic institutions.

Keywords: co‐evolution; institutional transfer; legal transplant; legal unification; production regime

Chapter.  10512 words. 

Subjects: Economic Systems

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