Chapter

The Virtues Benefit Their Possessor

Rosalind Hursthouse

in On Virtue Ethics

Published in print September 2001 | ISBN: 9780199247998
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597756 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199247994.003.0009
 The Virtues Benefit Their Possessor

Show Summary Details

Preview

Some familiar objections to the very idea that the virtues benefit their possessor can be quickly cleared away. When we consider the claim in the context of bringing up our own children or reflexion on our own lives, rather than in the context of trying to convince the wicked or the moral sceptic, we believe it. According to Phillips and McDowell, we believe it in so far as we are virtuous, because we have special conceptions of eudaimonia, benefit, harm, and loss, which guarantees its truth. But we also believe it on the basis of the sort of ethical, but non‐evaluative beliefs about human nature cited by Hare and Foot.

Keywords: Philippa Foot; R.M. Hare; John McDowell; moral sceptic; non‐evaluative beliefs; virtues

Chapter.  12478 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

Full text: subscription required

How to subscribe Recommend to my Librarian

Buy this work at Oxford University Press »

Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content. Please, subscribe or login to access all content.