Chapter

The Truth in Particularism

Joseph Raz

in Engaging Reason

Published in print January 2002 | ISBN: 9780199248001
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598272 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199248001.003.0011
 The Truth in Particularism

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Particularism's model of explanation is challenged on the ground that a sensible intelligibility principle requires that there must be an explanation for the difference between a good and a bad action. Raz is concerned with what it is to be guided by reason, as well as with the results of the fact that reason can often undermine particular outcomes. What determines the moral status of an action must extend beyond what the agent's reason for acting is. It is argued that there is a clear distinction between the evaluative and guiding functions of reasons.

Keywords: moral agency; moral status; moral theory; particularism; reasons

Chapter.  14814 words. 

Subjects: Moral Philosophy

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