Jean‐Jacques Laffont

in Incentives and Political Economy

Published in print October 2001 | ISBN: 9780199248681
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191596575 | DOI:

Series: Clarendon Lectures in Economics


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The author traces the origins of incentives in the design of political institutions to the works of Adam Smith, the American Federalists, and R. Frisch. The Chicago View of interest group politics is critically reviewed and seen as the background for the modern principal‐agent analysis of political economy. The structure of the book is reviewed and basic concepts of complete and incomplete contracting, asymmetric information, and endogenous coalition formation are introduced.

Keywords: asymmetric information; contracting; endogenous coalition formation; Federalists; Ragnar Frisch; incentives; interest groups; political institutions; principal‐agent analysis; Adam Smith

Chapter.  4679 words. 

Subjects: Microeconomics

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