Chapter

Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation

Jean‐Jacques Laffont

in Incentives and Political Economy

Published in print October 2001 | ISBN: 9780199248681
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191596575 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199248680.003.0007

Series: Clarendon Lectures in Economics

 Toward a Political Theory of the Emergence of Environmental Incentive Regulation

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This chapter discusses the choice of economic instruments for environmental policy in the political economy framework of imperfect information and the need to provide incentives for political majorities. Models of command‐and‐control regulation and interest groups competition are presented. These models are then extended to study the impact of the dynamics of re‐election based on campaign contributions.

Keywords: campaign contributions; command‐and‐control regulation; environmental policy; imperfect information; incentives; interest groups; political economy; political majority; re‐election dynamics

Chapter.  9691 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

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