Chapter

Collusion and Decentralization

Jean‐Jacques Laffont

in Incentives and Political Economy

Published in print October 2001 | ISBN: 9780199248681
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191596575 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199248680.003.0009

Series: Clarendon Lectures in Economics

 Collusion and Decentralization

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This chapter models the optimal degree of delegation and centralization of government as the degree of availability of communication between periphery and centre in a hierarchy. Under bounded rationality, delegation is shown to be superior as it uses more information than centralization. Under delegation with risk‐averse agents, it is shown that new transaction costs are introduced since the risk‐averse agent will require a risk premium for incentive compatibility.

Keywords: bounded rationality; centralization; communication; delegation; government; hierarchy; incentive compatibility; risk premium; risk‐aversion; transaction costs

Chapter.  7105 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Microeconomics

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