Chapter

The Inherently Normative Nature of Action Explanations

G. F. Schueler

in Reasons and Purposes

Published in print January 2003 | ISBN: 9780199250370
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598364 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199250375.003.0005
 The Inherently Normative Nature of Action Explanations

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There is a crucial difference between explaining actions on the basis of the agent's actual or possible practical deliberation (the deliberative model) and explaining them on the basis of some motivating desire (the direct desire model). The former applies the model of one's own rational deliberation to others in roughly the way Dennett's ‘intentional stance’ model suggests. It views the agent as genuinely rational and requires ascribing evaluations to the agent whose actions are being explained. It also entails that action explanations are themselves irreducibly normative.

Keywords: action explanations; Dennett; evaluation; intentional stance; normative; practical deliberation; rational agent

Chapter.  13096 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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