Belief and Experience

Bill Brewer

in Perception and Reason

Published in print March 2002 | ISBN: 9780199250455
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597114 | DOI:
 Belief and Experience

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Offers the Strawson Argument for the claim, (1), that the most basic beliefs about the spatial world have their contents only in virtue of their standing in certain relations with perceptual experiences. Only an experiential presentation of the particular mind‐independent thing in question suffices to tie down knowledgeable reference to spatial particulars in the face of the permanent epistemic possibility of massive qualitative reduplication of any sector of the physical world elsewhere in the universe. So the possibility of beliefs about mind‐independent particulars depends upon the most basic such beliefs’ standing in certain content‐fixing relations with perceptual experiences of the objects in question.

Keywords: belief; content‐fixing relations; massive reduplication; perceptual experience; spatial awareness; Strawson

Chapter.  12580 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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