Norms of Truth and Meaning

Paul Horwich

in Reflections on Meaning

Published in print November 2005 | ISBN: 9780199251247
Published online September 2006 | e-ISBN: 9780191603983 | DOI:
 Norms of Truth and Meaning

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Truth and meaning each have evaluative import. However, contrary to Dummett, Gibbard, Brandom, and many others, these notions are not constitutively normative — they are not themselves evaluative concepts. One element of this argument is a discussion of why true belief is desirable. Another element is a demonstration — in case meaning is a matter of implicitly following rules for the use of words — that such rule following can be analyzed in terms that are purely naturalistic (i.e., non-normative and non-semantic).

Keywords: truth; meaning; evaluative; normative; Dummett; Gibbard; Brandom; Boghossian; rule following; naturalistic

Chapter.  9920 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Language

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