Meaning, Use, and Truth

Paul Horwich

in From a Deflationary Point of View

Published in print February 2005 | ISBN: 9780199251261
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602252 | DOI:
Meaning, Use, and Truth

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This essay defends Wittgenstein’s ‘use-theory’ of meaning against Kripke’s critique of ‘dispositionalism.’ It reviews the distinction between two conceptions of truth: the traditional view and the deflationary view. It examines Kripke’s argument against the reduction of meaning-facts to facts about dispositions of use. It then shows that Kripke’s argument can be saved by a fallacy of equivocation only by presupposing an inflationary conception of truth.

Keywords: use-theory of meaning; dispositionalism; Wittgenstein; Kripke; truth

Chapter.  6544 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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