Chapter

Wittgenstein's Meta-philosophical Development

Paul Horwich

in From a Deflationary Point of View

Published in print February 2005 | ISBN: 9780199251261
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602252 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199251266.003.0011
Wittgenstein's Meta-philosophical Development

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This essay opposes the claim that Wittgenstein provided two distinct and contradictory philosophies on meaning in his ‘Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus’ (1922) and ‘Philosophical Investigations’ (1953). It is argued that basis of Wittgenstein’s thought was his view of what ‘philosophy’ is rather than what ‘meaning’ is. From this perspective, the defect in the Tractatus can be observed as a small incoherence within its meta-philosophy, and the central ideas of the investigations emerge when this mistake is rectified.

Keywords: Wittgenstein; philosophy; meaning

Chapter.  4647 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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