Chapter

The Myth of Cartesian Scepticism: Dreaming, Doubts, and Epistemic Closure

Jay F. Rosenberg

in Thinking about Knowing

Published in print October 2002 | ISBN: 9780199251339
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598326 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199251339.003.0002
 The Myth of Cartesian Scepticism: Dreaming, Doubts, and Epistemic Closure

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Offers a critical assessment of Descartes's arguments for external‐world scepticism. Even granted charitable exegetical concessions, the arguments prove to be neither intuitive nor compelling. The same holds true for contemporary sceptical reasonings in the Cartesian style, including those based on epistemic ‘closure principles’ and our inability to rule out particular sceptical scenarios.

Keywords: Descartes; epistemic closure principles; sceptical scenarios; scepticism

Chapter.  24514 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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