Chapter

Peircean Enquiry: Knowledge Without Truth

Jay F. Rosenberg

in Thinking about Knowing

Published in print October 2002 | ISBN: 9780199251339
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598326 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199251339.003.0007
 Peircean Enquiry: Knowledge Without Truth

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Devoted to an explicit exploration of the relationships between knowledge and truth. Opens with a critique of reliabilist externalist views of epistemic justification and defends the characteristically pragmatist conclusion that truth cannot function as the goal of enquiry. What is arguably wanted is not truth but objectivity, and C. S. Peirce's appeal to the ‘abductive’ method of science, as a fallible and inter‐subjective means of fixing beliefs, yields a useful analysis of the latter notion.

Keywords: enquiry; externalist; justification; knowledge; objectivity; Peirce; pragmatist; reliabilist; science; truth

Chapter.  21619 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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