Chapter

First Person Authority <sup>265</sup>

Ernie Lepore and Kirk Ludwig

in Donald Davidson

Published in print March 2005 | ISBN: 9780199251346
Published online July 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602634 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199251347.003.0022
 First Person Authority  265

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Takes up the question whether an account of meaning and the propositional attitudes that takes the third person standpoint of the radical interpreter as methodologically and conceptually basic can accommodate our special epistemic position with respect to our own thoughts. Examines Davidson’s most extended argument for this in ’First Person Authority’ and concludes that the argument falls short of explaining the relevant asymmetry in the knowledge one has of one’s own thoughts and the knowledge that other people do.

Keywords: asymmetry of warrant; First Person Authority; self-knowledge; third person standpoint

Chapter.  14146 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy

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