Chapter

Parts of the Soul and the Psychology of Virtue

Christopher Bobonich

in Plato's Utopia Recast

Published in print July 2002 | ISBN: 9780199251438
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191597084 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199251436.003.0003
 Parts of the Soul and the Psychology of Virtue

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Plato's psychology in the Phaedo and the Republic is committed to a partitioning thesis that partitions the individual human being into a compound of distinct agent‐like parts. This chapter argues that the Laws abandons the Republic's theory of parts of the soul. I examine the Laws’ new theory of akrasia (weakness of will) and some of the implications of the Laws’ new psychology for broader issues in Plato's ethics.

Keywords: akrasia; Laws; partitioning; psychic intervention; Republic; soul; strong and weak akrasia

Chapter.  32775 words. 

Subjects: Ancient Philosophy

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