Chapter

Anti‐essentialism (1979)

Robert C. Stalnaker

in Ways a World Might Be

Published in print August 2003 | ISBN: 9780199251483
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602320 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199251487.003.0005
 Anti‐essentialism (1979)

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The bare particular anti-essentialism theory holds that for every individual and every property, there are possible worlds in which the individual has the property and possible worlds in which it does not. It is argued that one cannot make semantical sense out of bare particular anti-essentialism within the framework of the standard semantics for modal logic. An alternative to the standard semantics is proposed that can make sense out of the bare particular theory. The alternative will not require that the anti-essentialism doctrine be true, but that doctrine will be embodied in a simple formal condition which is naturally imposed on the models definable within the alternative semantics.

Keywords: bare particular anti-essentialism theory; semantics; doctrine; modal logic; alternative semantics

Chapter.  6915 words.  Illustrated.

Subjects: Metaphysics

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