Reference and Necessity (1997)

Robert C. Stalnaker

in Ways a World Might Be

Published in print August 2003 | ISBN: 9780199251483
Published online April 2005 | e-ISBN: 9780191602320 | DOI:
 Reference and Necessity (1997)

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This paper explores the relationship between theses and questions about reference, necessity, and possibility. The analysis focuses on the theses Saul Kripke defends about individuals and their names. It is argued that Kripke’s contribution was to separate metaphysical and semantic issues. Kripke’s theses on proper names and reference do not presuppose any controversial metaphysical theories. No metaphysical conclusions are derived from theses about reference and names, although clarifications on the nature of reference helps in rebuttals to arguments against metaphysical theses that Kripke defends.

Keywords: reference; names; necessity; possibility; Saul Kripke; metaphysics; semantics

Chapter.  11432 words. 

Subjects: Metaphysics

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