Chapter

Conclusions

Lawrence Sklar

in Theory and Truth

Published in print February 2002 | ISBN: 9780199251575
Published online November 2003 | e-ISBN: 9780191598449 | DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0199251576.003.0006
 Conclusions

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Abstract, philosophical scepticism about the truth of theories can rest on doubts about positing unobservables, doubts arising out of the role played by idealization in theories, and doubts arising from the transient place of our theories in our corpus of accepted theories. But each of these kinds of scepticism can play a role within scientific theory construction and evaluation. As a local project within ongoing science, each mode of sceptical argument has a far richer and more interesting structure than is evident from the role played by these arguments in abstract philosophy.

Keywords: idealization; scientific theory; scepticism; theory construction; transience; unobservables

Chapter.  1829 words. 

Subjects: Philosophy of Science

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